Roaming services in wireless networks provide people with preferable flexibility and convenience. However, such advantages should be offered with both security and privacy in mind. With consideration on privacy protection during roaming in wireless networks, we proposed a hierarchical ID-based roaming protocol in this paper. In our scheme, we use a 2-layer hierarchical ID-based cryptosystem in which a trusted party acts as the root authority, each domain server acts as the second-layer authority, and the roaming user is the end user. With the hierarchical ID-based cryptosystem, we can avoid involvement with home network, and keep the roaming the user's identity private. Furthermore, not only the root authority is relieved from management of a large amount of private/public key pairs, but the domain servers are free to generate key pairs for their registered users. At the same time, we use hash chains together with ID-based signatures to achieve non-repudiation for service payment.
INTRODUCTION
As the fast development of wireless technology, various wireless networks with higher data rate and broader communication range have been deployed and used in our daily life, including telecommunication systems (e.g. 3G etc.), As illustrated in Figure 1 , the roaming process typically involves two wireless networks, the home network (HN) and the foreign network (FN), and the roaming user. Normally the foreign network (FN) and the home network (HN) have a roaming agreement, so that the mobile user can have network access at FN. Before the user can access resource provided by FN, appropriate authentication and registration process should be undertaken between the roaming user U and foreign server FS, usually with the help of the user's home network HN. Security assurance of this process is of great importance to all three involved parties because the foreign network does not want its resource or service be used by illegitimate users without payment, the home network does not want to be responsible for illegitimate usage of FN's resource, and the mobile user does not want to be charged by FN for resource usage by someone else.
Privacy protection for roaming users during the roaming process has been an increasing concern for people that care about their privacy. Give the open nature of radio media used in wireless access networks, privacy protection is even more meaningful and demanding in such an environment. A roaming user's privacy like movement pattern, network usage habit etc. should be protected from potential adversary intending to break users' privacy.
To protect privacy of roaming users in wireless networks, not only the user's identity should be protected, but also linkability between messages sent by the user should be kept private. It is clear that privacy leakage exists if an adversary can link two messages even when he does not know who is the sender. The anonymity requirement can be easily fulfilled by encrypting the user's identity, but the unlinkability requirement requires more tricky treatments. Although there are quite a few proposals on anonymous roaming protocols in literature, the unlinkability problem during the roaming process is not solved.
Privacy protection comes in different levels. A good anonymity requirement classification has been proposed in [10] , in which different anonymity requirements are grouped into five classes from the weakest to the strongest one. The classification is defined in the following. And each class is defined over the previous class, i.e.,
• C1: Any user is anonymous and his activities are unlinkable to eavesdroppers; • C2: In addition to C1 anonymity, any user is anonymous and his activities are unlinkable to foreign servers; • C3: In addition to C2 anonymity, relationship anonymity between the user and servers from eavesdroppers; • C4: In addition to C3 anonymity, the home server is anonymous to foreign servers; • C5: In addition to C4 anonymity, any user is anonymous and his activities are unlinkable to his home server. Here we argue that class C4 is not so crucial as other classes for user privacy protection. Even if a foreign server knows the identity of one's home server, the user is still anonymous to the foreign server though the anonymity level is decreased. And the foreign server is not able to trace the roaming user though it knows the user's home server identity. Hence we define a new class in addition to the above anonymity classes:
• C5−: In addition C4 anonymity, any user is anonymous and his activities are unlinkable to his home server, but foreign servers are allowed to know the identity of the home server. In this paper, we propose a secure privacy-preserving roaming protocol based on the hierarchical ID-based cryptosystem to achieve class C5− privacy protection. In our scheme, we use a 2-layer hierarchical ID-based cryptosystem in which a trusted party acts as the root authority, each domain server acts as the second-layer authority, and the roaming user is the end user. Not only the root authority is relieved from management of a large amount of private/public key pairs, but the domain servers are free to generate key pairs for their registered users. A user can anonymously authenticate to a foreign network without communication with its home domain, and no one can identify the user or link messages unless the foreign server colludes with the home server.
RELATED WORK
The Global System for Mobile (GSM) communication system [9] is the first radio network providing anonymity to subscribers. In GSM, after a roaming subscriber authenticates himself to a foreign network using his IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identifier), he is assigned a series of TMSI's (Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identifier). By using a different TMSI in each session, subscribers are provided with untraceability to some extent. However, since the IMSI is transmitted over the air in plaintext during the authentication process, an adversary that continuously eavesdrops the radio network can easily identify the subscriber by his IMSI. Clearly, GSM only offers limited class C1 privacy protection.
The third generation mobile cellular communication system UMTS [1], though improved from the security mechanism of GSM, uses the same mechanism to provide anonymity for subscribers. UMTS also uses IMSI for the first registration at the foreign network, and obtain a number of TMSIs for subsequent sessions. Likewise, UMTS provides only limited class C1 privacy protection.
In the same paper proposing the classification scheme [10] , the authors proposed a solution which is able to achieve class C3 privacy protection, but not C4 and C5. And moreover, it requires involvement of the home authority. The foreign authority has to know the home authority's identity so as to finish the authentication process, and the home authority has to know the user's identity for the purpose of validation. Furthermore, in the homeless authentication protocol, a user is traceable if the home authority is able to monitor network communication in the foreign network. In a recent paper [13] , a deposit-case attack is shown to be able to trick a mobile user to authenticate with a malicious server.
Two protocols proposed in [8, 15] are designed for payment non-repudiation in addition to user anonymity. Both protocols make use of PKC cryptosystems to provide identity confidentiality, and non-repudiation is achieved by hash chains. But neither schemes offer privacy protection higher than class C2.
A number of schemes that appeared in literature aiming to achieve class C2 anonymity, including [2, 4, 16, 14, 7] . Among these schemes, the protocol proposed in [4] is also susceptible to the so-called deposit-case attack [13] . The schemes in [16] and [7] are vulnerable to linkability attacks, and this design flaw compromises class C1 anonymity. The protocol proposed in [14] is proved to be secure but only provides C2 privacy protection.
PRELIMINARY
In this section, we provide some preliminary knowledge on ID-based encryption scheme and hierarchical ID-based scheme. The first fully-functional ID-based encryption is due to Boneh and Franklin [3] . ID-based encryption has a number of advantages over traditional PKC systems. The public key can be any identity information like one's email address or phone number. It also makes revocation of public keys much easier, and delegation of decryption keys in ID-based encryption makes provides great flexibility for users. For example, the public key can be "EmailAddress||ExpireDate" so that this public key is only valid for the specified expire date. After that date, the corresponding private key is revoked automatically if a new private key for a new expire date is not provided by the key generation center. This type of key can be delegated to one's mobile device so that it is only usable before the expire date even if the device is lost or stolen. Moreover, there is no need to store a public key database in ID-based encryption systems.
A number of notations used here and in our protocol are listed in the following table: The ID-based encryption system is based on a bilinear map between two groups G1 and G2 of order q for some large prime q (e.g. 160-bit). The bilinear map e : G1 × G1 → G2 satisfies the following conditions:
• Bilinear: for all P, Q ∈ G1 and a, b ∈ Z * q , e(aP, bQ) = e(P, Q) ab .
• Non-degenerate: there exists a generator P of G1 such that e(P, P ) = 1.
• Computable: there is an efficient algorithm to compute e(P, Q) for any P, Q ∈ G1. Then a master secret s ∈ Z * q and a generator P are also selected by an authority. Then each user's ID-based private key can be computed as K = sH1(U ), where U is the user's identity. Then the user's identity U can be used to encrypt messages and resulting ciphertexts can be decrypted with the corresponding key K [3] .
The security of ID-based encryption schemes is based on the hardness of the bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problem: Given P, aP, bP, cP for some a, b, c ∈ Z * q , to compute e(P, P ) abc ∈ G2. Meanwhile, we assume the gap DiffieHellman problem is intractable on G1, which means solving the CDHP (Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem) in G1 with the help of the oracle that solves the DDHP (Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem) in G1 is hard.
Similar to traditional public key infrastructure that allows a hierarchy of certificate authorities, ID-based encryption system can be also constructed in a hierarchical way [6] . It is defined on a linear e-one-way hash function h : G1 × Z * q → G1, which has the following properties:
No probabilistic polynomial algorithm can solve the linear e-one-way hash problem: given x, xi ∈ Z * q , P ∈ G1, and xi, h(aP, xi) for i = 1, 2, ..
., n, computing h(aP, x).
A 2-level hierarchical ID-based encryption system defined in [6] as follows:
• Setup: let G1, G2 be two groups and e be a bilinear map over these groups. Let h : G1 × Z * q → G1 be a linear e-one-way function. Pick a random number s ∈ Z * q as the master secret, then the public key is G1, G2, e, P, sP, H1, H2, H3 , where P is the generator of G1 and H1, H2, H3 are hash functions.
• KeyGen1: the key for domain S is KS = sH1(S) ∈ G1.
• KeyGen2: the key for user with identity U in domain S is K = h(KS, H2(S||U )). In the same way as traditional structure of hierarchical authority, in the 2-level hierarchical ID-based scheme each domain can generate ID-based private keys for its users. In the meantime, it preserves the advantage of ID-based encryption, i.e. the corresponding public key is just the domain ID and the user's ID.
THE HIERARCHICAL ID-BASED ANONYMOUS ROAMING PROTOCOL
In this section, we present our hierarchical ID-based private authentication protocol. We first analyze the security and privacy requirements in the roaming scenario, and then present the assumptions of our scheme as well as the adversary model. After that, we describe the details of our protocol.
Requirements, Assumptions and Adversary Model
During the roaming process from one's home network to a foreign network, we specifically consider the following security/privacy issues:
• User anonymity: As mentioned in the first section, our protocol is designed to offer class C5− privacy protection, which means that the user's identity and activities should be protected from foreign servers, his home server as well as outsiders.
• Non-repudiation: For purpose of billing, it is required that a user cannot deny his usage of network services.
Regarding the anonymity requirement, we do not intend to hide the home server's identity from the foreign server, though the foreign server is able to know which domain the roaming user belongs to. Even so, the foreign server is not able to trace the roaming user after he/she roams to another network. An adversary has full control over the communication channel, including monitoring, modifying, injecting, deleting messages over the air. An outside adversary aims to corrupt the above security requirements. Both the home server and the foreign server may be malicious, and are interested in tracking movement of a roaming user. But they would not collude with each other as normally they are competitors to each other in the network service market.
The Protocol
In our protocol, we assume that a 2-level hierarchical IDbased encryption scheme has been implemented in the system according to the description above. A master secret s is generated by a trusted root server and the public key is G1, G2, e, P, sP, H1, H2, H3 . The intractability of the BDH problem as well as the Gap-CDH problem is assumed.
Each network domain server obtains its domain secret from the root server as described above: a domain server S is assigned a domain key KS = sH1(S). Then a user U can register at a domain server and present a number of pseudonyms Nym1, ...N ymn to the server. The domain server then generates keys for the user U as ki = h(KS, H2(S||Nymi)) for each pseudonym Nymi.
The anonymous roaming protocol only involves two entities, namely the roaming user and the foreign network server, without assistance of the user's home server. As illustrated in the following, it comprises of four messages between the roaming user and the foreign server.
• 1. The roaming user selects a nonce Nu and a random number ru. He computes ruP and sends the first message to the foreign server to request services. • 2. The foreign server chooses a nonce Ns and a random number rs. It computes rsP and a cookie using a private hash key hk: cookie = H4(hk||Nu||Ns||ruP ||rsP ). Then he returns Ns, rsP and his identity to the user. 
(H1(IDFS), ki) = e(H1(IDFS), h(KID HS , H2(IDHS||Nymi)))
, and k u = rursP . Then he calculates the session key to be shared with the foreign server as sku = H4(ku||k u ||IDFS||Nymi ||Nu||Ns||1), and an authenticator as macu = H4(ku||k u ||IDFS||Nymi||Nu||Ns||0).
Then the user uses the foreign server's ID-based public key (i.e. its identity) to encrypt the following items: the home server's identity IDHS, the user's pseudonym Nymi, the random nonces Nu, Ns, and the authenticator macu. After that, it sends the resulting ciphertext to the foreign server. If the request passes the verification, the foreign server computes the session key as sks = H4(ks||k s ||IDFS|| Nymi||Nu||Ns||1), and an authenticator macs = H4(ks ||k s ||IDFS||Nymi||Nu||Ns||2). At last, the foreign server returns the authenticator to the roaming user.
• 5. When the user receives the reply from the foreign server, he computes mac * s = H4(ku||k u ||IDFS||Nymi|| Nu||Ns||2) and verifies whether macs = mac * s . He aborts the protocol if the equation does not hold.
At the end of the protocol, the foreign server accepts the roaming user as an authenticated one given all verifications passed successfully, and so does the roaming user. Meanwhile, a session key is established to secure the link between the user and the foreign network.
Discussion
In the above authentication protocol, we have not dealt with the ID-based private key distribution problem and the non-repudiation problem. Before the proposed roaming protocol, the first step is to distribute ID-based private keys to each user according to their pseudonyms. Secrecy during this step is of extreme importance for our roaming authentication protocol, otherwise there is no anonymity in the subsequent roaming process.
After successful execution of the roaming authentication protocol, non-repudiation should be provided in the following service request protocol. In this step, we also use oneway hash chains to implement non-repudiation.
Anonymous ID-based key Issuing
A number of anonymous ID-based key issuing schemes have been proposed, e.g. [12] . However, the anonymous IDbased key issuing method in [12] cannot be directly applied in our case, as hierarchical ID-based encryption is used in our protocol but [12] is only applicable to standard ID-based encryption systems. Therefore, we propose the following private key issuing method under the hierarchical ID-based encryption setting.
Suppose a user registers at his home domain HS with his real identity U and obtains the corresponding private key K = h(KS, H2(HS||U )). Then the anonymous ID-based key issuing process goes as follows:
• 1. The user chooses a number of pseudonym Nymi (i = 1, ..., n), and encrypts them using the home server's public key. He computes a signature using his ID-based key, and sends U, Nu, EID HS (Nym1, ..., N ymn, Nu), SigU (U, Nu, Nym1, ..., N ymn) to the home server.
• 2. 
Non-Repudiation in Service Request
After the user successfully finishes mutual authentication with the foreign server, the user can request service from the foreign network. We use the hash chain, the same technique used in [15, 5] , for payment non-repudiation.
Before the user requests any network service, he generates a hash chain from a randomly chosen number n:
where L is the length of the hash chain. It is the responsibility of the user to keep n, H(n), ..., H L−1 (n) private. Then the user sends the following request with a secure channel protected by the established session key to the foreign server:
The foreign server verifies the signature using the roaming user's pseudonym and decides whether to provide services. If the foreign server agrees to provide services to the roaming user, it sends a reply to the user:
Then after the user has requested the service, he has to release the hash value H i (n) one by one at a pre-defined interval. If the user cannot get requested service from the foreign network, he stops sending these hash values. On the other hand, the foreign server checks the received hash value by verifying the equation H(H i (n)) = H i+1 (n). If the equation does not hold, the foreign server stops providing service to the user.
ANALYSIS
In this section, we first analyze security and privacy of our hierarchical ID-based roaming protocol, and then evaluate its communication and computation cost.
Security
With the proposed protocol, the foreign server can authenticate the roaming user without assistance of the user's home server. The foreign server does not need to verify any certificate as in traditional public key cryptosystems. These benefits attribute to the hierarchical ID-based encryption system. By using ID-based key exchange, the foreign server is ensured that the roaming user is a valid subscriber of the claimed home domain after a successful protocol execution. Only legitimate roaming users with valid keys can run the protocol successfully with the foreign server. An invalid user, however, cannot derive the correct session key so as to be authenticated by the foreign server.
Based on the GDHP assumption, our protocol also achieves perfect forward secrecy. Perfect forward secrecy is provided at the cost of two point multiplications, but it guarantees security in case of long-term key compromise. Even if the user's secret key obtained from his home server is compromised, previous communication content is still secured.
User's ID-based key revocation is much easier with IDbased encryption scheme than traditional PKC systems. A user's public key can be generated as "UserNym||Expiry− Date", such that the pseudonym is only valid for that date in the public key. When the user's contract with his home domain expires, the home server just stops issuing private keys to the user any more.
Taking advantage of the same feature of the ID-based encryption scheme, our proposed protocol provides a simple way to reduce the loss in case of the user device being lost or stolen. Assume the type of pseudonym "UserNym||Expiry− Date" is used in the ID-based encryption scheme, then the user can load the mobile device with the pseudonyms valid only in the following few days. If the device is stolen or lost, the pseudonyms on the mobile device are not usable after these days, which avoids the user's further loss.
Privacy
For a roaming user, the related privacy information includes the user's identity, location, and movement. Hiding the user's identity and avoiding linkage between two transactions of the same user are the main ways to providing privacy protection for users.
The user's identity is protected from passive eavesdroppers. For an eavesdropper of the protocol, the user's pseudonym and his home domain identity are protected with the foreign server's ID-based public key. As a result, no outsider can discover who the roaming user is and which domain this user belongs to. The user's identity is also protected from the foreign server and his home server. In our protocol, each user submits a number of pseudonyms to his home server at the time of registration, and receives corresponding ID-based private keys computed from these pseudonyms by the home server. These pseudonyms, instead of the user's real identity, are used in the roaming authentication protocol for the purpose of privacy protection. The user can resubmit new pseudonyms to his home server for new private keys with the private IDbased key issuing protocol if he uses up his private keys. Therefore, only the user's home server knows the relationship between a pseudonym and the real identity. In our roaming authentication protocol, the user uses his pseudonym and the home domain identity for authentication with the foreign server. The user's pseudonym is encrypted by the foreign server's ID-based public key so that no one else can know it, including even the user's home server. Since the foreign server won't collude with the home server as assumed, the home server is unable to discover any linkage between two transactions initiated by the same user. On the other hand, the foreign server only gets to know one of the user's pseudonyms at each time, and these pseudonyms are used for only once. As there is no linkage between pseudonyms, the foreign server is unable to identify the user or link two transactions initiated by the same user.
Although the foreign server gets to know the identity of the user's home server, we argue such information does not disclose too much privacy of the user but provides the foreign server with assurance of the user's accountability. Knowing the identity of the user's home server, the foreign server is able to identify the home domain of the roaming server, and the anonymity set in which the user is anonymous is reduced to the set of users registered with the specific home domain. To achieve higher privacy protection, the user may register with more than one domain and uses different domain identities in the roaming authentication protocol. The drawback of this approach is that the user is required to register with multiple domains and take care of multiple bills each month. On the other hand, if the home domain identity is hidden from the foreign server, the foreign network is under the finance risk that the usage of its network service might not be paid. Knowing the home domain identity, the foreign server can decide whether to provide network services so as to reduce the finance risk.
Performance
We evaluate the performance of our protocol on computation and communication and compare it with existing protocols. Our protocol achieves mutual authentication, DoS resistance and privacy protection with only 4 local message transmissions. A distinguishable feature of our protocol is no involvement of the user's home server. This enables the protocol to save a large fraction of communication cost. In particular, when the user roams to a foreign domain far from his home network, the saving on communication cost with our protocol is much significant since it requires only local communication. On the contrary, all existing schemes require involvement of the home server and inter-domain communication is required to authenticate the roaming user. Normally, two inter-domain messages and at least two local messages are needed as specified in these protocols.
In terms of computation cost, both the roaming user and the foreign server need 2 point multiplications and 1 pairing computation. Additionally, the roaming user needs one more ID-based encryption, and the foreign server needs one more ID-based decryption. We choose the security parameter q to be 160-bit long such that it has the same security level as 1024-bit RSA cryptosystem. According to the benchmark in [11] , the roaming user has a computation overhead of 48ms while the foreign server's overhead is 43ms.
In table 1, we compare our protocol with previous schemes on computation, communications cost as well as security features. The best result of existing protocols is class C3 privacy protection achieved by Samfat et al. [10] , which makes use of PKC cryptosystem. All other existing schemes fail to offer anonymity higher than C3. Our scheme, however, is able to achieve class C5 anonymity except that one's home domain identity is disclosed to the foreign network, defined as C5− anonymity.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a secure privacy-preserving roaming protocol based on hierarchical ID-based encryption scheme. The proposed scheme provides user anonymity against the foreign server and his home server, and moreover, it does not need the home server online for authentication between the user and the foreign server. Under the assumption that the home server does not collude with any foreign server, the user's activity is totally anonymous to the foreign server, the home server as well as outside adversaries. A hash chain based mechanism is also used in our scheme to achieve non-repudiation on service payment. Furthermore, we discuss how to distribute private ID-based keys to users in an anonymous way. We compare our scheme to existing protocols, and it shows that our protocol provides higher privacy protection and better performance.
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